摘  要

经理股票期权(Executive Stock Options, ESO)是一种经发达国家实践证明的行之有效的长期激励方式，其产生的诱因在于传统的薪酬结构无法提供解决委托代理问题所需要的长期激励。一段时间以来，我国的国有企业和上市公司纷纷借鉴外国模式，准备大力推行股票期权，在不过几年的时间里己有上百家企业开始实行，并得到越来越多企业的瞩目。但是由于中国现实条件的限制，真正意义上的股票期权并没有得到实施。2005年底，中国证监会发布了《上市公司股权激励管理方法》，2006年10月中国证监会宣告股权分置改革已经基本完成。在这样的背景下，重新审视经理股票期权制度是十分必要的。因此，本文将以上市公司经理股票期权制度作为研究对象，重新研究适合我国上市公司发展现状的经理股票期权计划，并在此基础上研究如何优化经理股票期权激励的实施环境。

     本文首先回顾和总结了国内外股票期权的研究成果，然后在第二章中对股票期权的基本理论进行了综述，着重介绍了国外经理股票期权的实践，系统分析了经理股票期权正反两方面的效应。第三章和第四章通过我国上市公司经理股票期权的实践和实证研究证实，我国上市公司经理股票期权制度虽然存在着激励效应，但激励效果有限，从本质上来看都不是真正意义上的股票期权。第五章结合我国当前政策环境和资本市场的发展状况，重新设计了我国上市公司经理股票期权计划。对我国上市公司经理股票期权激励的环境优化提出了制度建议：健全资本市场；是建立和完善职业经理人市场；完善公司内部治理等。

关键字：经理股票期权，激励机制，股权激励

 ABSTRACT

  Executive  Stock Option is  a measure of long-term  stimulation, whose effectiveness has been proved by the practice of many developed countries. The reason why ESO emerged is that the traditional salary structure cannot supply the long-term stimulation that is necessary to solve the Principal-Agent problem. For a long time, many state-owned enterprises have taken foreign ESO mode to spread it, which makes it clear that the strong request of enterprises to reform the property rights system and to solve benefit conflict in principal-agent problem. However, the real mechanism still were not implemented for the sake of realistic conditions formerly. At the end of 2005, the Chinese Securities Supervisory Association had issued "Listed Company Stockholder's rights Policing method", and announced stock right putting divided reform completed basically in October, 2006. Under such background, it is extremely essential that carefully examined incentive mechanism of ESO. Therefore, this thesis took ESO of listed company as the object of study, redesign ESO that match the present situation of the listed company, and researched how to optimize the environment on the ESO implementation on basic of it.

Firstly this thesis reviewed and summarized the domestic and foreign research results on the stock option, then carried on the basic theory in chapter 2, introduced emphatically the practice of ESO abroad, systematically analyzed positive and negative effects, and enduce the enlightenment to us that the implement of ESO. Through the practice on ESO of listed company in our country and empirical research confirm in chapter 3 and 4 that ESO system of listed company system exsit incentive effect but limited, in essence all are not real stock options. According to current policy condition and capital market development situation, redesign ESO plan of the listed company in chapter 5. Finally, the thesis puts forward the suggestion on optimizing the environment of ESO implement: perfect the capital marke; establish and consume professional manager market; perfect the corporate internal governance.

Key Words:  Executive Stock Options, Incentive Mechanism, Equity Incentive